We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the problems that we address, previous authors have presented polynomial-time algorithms for computing a "Pareto-stable" matching. In the case of college admissions, these algorithms require the preferences of the colleges over groups of students to satisfy a technical condition related to responsiveness. We design new polynomial-time Pareto-stable algorithms for stable marriage and college admissions that correspond to strategyproof mechanisms. For stable marriage, it is known that no Pareto-stable mechanism is strategyproof for all of the agents; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the agents on one side of the market. For college admissions, it is known that no Pareto-stable mechanism can be strategyproof for the colleges; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the students.
Introduction
Gale and Shapley [7] introduced the stable marriage model and its generalization to the college admissions model. Their work spawned a vast literature on two-sided matching; see Manlove [11] for a recent survey. The present paper is primarily concerned with variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models where the agents have weak preferences, i.e., where indifferences are allowed.
In the most basic stable marriage model, we are given an equal number of men and women, where each man (resp., woman) has complete, strict preferences over the set of women (resp., men); we refer to this model as SMCS. For SMCS, an outcome is a matching that pairs up all of the men and women into disjoint man-woman pairs. A man-woman pair (p, q) is said to form a blocking pair for a matching M if p prefers q to his partner in M and q prefers p to her partner in M. A matching is stable if it does not have a blocking pair. It is straightforward to prove that any stable matching is also Pareto-optimal. Gale and Shapley presented the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm for the SMCS problem and proved that the man-proposing version of the DA algorithm produces the unique man-optimal (and woman-pessimal) stable matching. Roth [12] showed that the associated mechanism, which we refer to as the man-proposing DA mechanism, is strategyproof for the men, i.e., it is a weakly dominant strategy for each man to declare his true preferences. Unfortunately, the man-proposing DA mechanism is not strategyproof for the women. In fact, Roth [12] showed that no stable mechanism for SMCS is strategyproof for all of the agents.
The SMCW model is the generalization of the SMCS model in which each man (resp., woman) has weak preferences over the set of women (resp., men). When indifferences are allowed, we need to refine our notion of a blocking pair. A man-woman pair (p, q) is said to form a strongly blocking pair for a matching M if p prefers q to his partner in M and q prefers p to her partner in M. A matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and does not have a strongly blocking pair. Two other natural notions of stability, namely strong stability and super-stability, have been investigated in the literature (see Manlove [11, Chapter 3] for a survey of these results). We focus on weak stability because every SMCW instance admits a weakly stable matching (this follows from the existence of stable matchings for SMCS, coupled with arbitrary tie-breaking), but not every SMCW instance admits a strongly stable or super-stable matching. It is straightforward to exhibit SMCW instances (with as few as two men and two women) for which some weakly stable matching is not Pareto-optimal. Sotomayor [16] argues that Pareto-stability (i.e., Paretooptimality plus weak stability) is an appropriate solution concept for SMCW and certain other matching models with weak preferences, and proves that every SMCW instance admits a Paretostable matching.
Erdil and Ergin [4] and Chen and Ghosh [2] present polynomial-time algorithms for computing a Pareto-stable matching of a given SMCW instance; in fact, these algorithms are applicable to certain more general models to be discussed shortly. Given the existence of a stable mechanism for SMCS that is strategyproof for the men (or, symmetrically, for the women), it is natural to ask whether there is a Pareto-stable mechanism for SMCW that is strategyproof for the men. We cannot hope to find a Pareto-stable mechanism for SMCW that is strategyproof for all agents, since that would imply a stable mechanism for SMCS that is strategyproof for all agents. A similar statement holds for the SMIW model, the generalization of the SMCW model in which the agents are allowed to express incomplete preferences. See Section 4 for a formal definition of the SMIW model and the associated notions of weak stability and Pareto-stability. Throughout the remainder of the paper, when we say that a mechanism for a stable marriage model is strategyproof, we mean that it is strategyproof for the agents on one side of the market; moreover, unless otherwise specified, it is to be understood that the mechanism is strategyproof for the men. The Pareto-stable algorithms of Erdil and Ergin, and of Chen and Ghosh, are based on a two-phase approach where the first phase runs the Gale-Shapley DA algorithm after breaking all ties arbitrarily. In Appendix A we show that this approach does not provide a strategyproof mechanism.
This paper provides the first Pareto-stable mechanism for SMIW (and also SMCW) that is shown to be strategyproof. We present a nondeterministic algorithm for SMIW that generalizes Gale and Shapley's DA algorithm as follows: in each iteration, a nondeterministically chosen unmatched man "proposes" simultaneously to all of the women in his next-highest tier of preference (i.e., the highest tier to which he has not already proposed); the women respond to this proposal by solving a certain maximum-weight matching problem to determine which man becomes unmatched (i.e., the man making the proposal or one of the tentatively matched men). Our generalization of the DA mechanism admits a polynomial-time implementation.
The college admissions model with weak preferences, which we denote CAW, is a further generalization of the SMIW model. In the CAW model, students and colleges are being matched rather than men and women, and each college has a positive integer capacity representing the number of students that it can accommodate. See Section 5 for a formal definition of the CAW model and the associated notions of weak stability and Pareto-stability.
A key difference between CAW and SMIW is that in addition to expressing preferences over individual students, the colleges have preferences over groups of students. This characteristic is shared by the CAS model, which is the restriction of the CAW model to strict preferences. It is known that no stable mechanism for CAS is strategyproof for the colleges [13] ; the proof makes use of the fact that the colleges do not (in general) have unit demand. It follows that no Paretostable mechanism for CAW is strategyproof for the colleges. Throughout the remainder of the paper, when we say that a mechanism for a college admissions model is strategyproof, we mean that it is strategyproof for the students.
Gale and Shapley's DA algorithm generalizes easily to the CAS model. Roth [13] has shown that the student-proposing DA algorithm provides a strategyproof stable mechanism for CAS when the preferences of the colleges are responsive. When the colleges have responsive preferences, the student-proposing DA mechanism is also known to be student-optimal for CAS [13] .
Erdil and Ergin [4] consider the special case of the CAW model where the following restrictions hold for all students x and colleges y: x is not indifferent between being assigned to y and being left unassigned; y is not indifferent between having one of its slots assigned to x and having that slot left unfilled. We remark that this special case of CAW corresponds to the HRT problem discussed in Manlove [11, Chapter 3] . 1 For this special case, Erdil and Ergin present a polynomialtime algorithm for computing a Pareto-stable matching when the preferences of the colleges satisfy a technical restriction related to responsiveness. We consider the same class of preferences, which 1 In the model of Erdil and Ergin, which is stated using worker-firm terminology rather than student-college terminology, a "no indifference to unemployment/vacancy" assumption makes the aforementioned restrictions explicit. In the HRT model of Manlove, which is stated using resident-hospital terminology rather than student-college terminology, it is assumed that a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs is given, and that each agent specifies weak preferences over the set of agents with whom they form an acceptable pair. We consider the approach of Erdil-Ergin -where the starting point is the preferences of the individual agents, and the "acceptability" of a given pair of agents may be deduced from those preferences -to be more natural, but the resulting models are equivalent.
we refer to as minimally responsive; see Section 5 for a formal definition. The algorithm of Erdil and Ergin does not provide a strategyproof mechanism. Chen and Ghosh [2] build on the results of Erdil and Ergin by considering the many-to-many generalization of HRT in which the agents on both sides of the market have capacities (and the agent preferences are minimally responsive). For this generalization, Chen and Ghosh provide a strongly polynomial-time algorithm. No strategyproof mechanism (even for the agents on one side of the market) is possible in the many-to-many setting, since it is a generalization of CAS. We provide the first Pareto-stable mechanism for CAW that is shown to be strategyproof. As in the work of Erdil-Ergin and Chen-Ghosh, we assume that the preferences of the colleges are minimally responsive. We can also handle the class of college preferences "induced by additive utility" that is defined in Section 5.2.
In the many-to-many matching setting addressed by Chen and Ghosh [2] , a pair of agents (on opposite sides of the market) can be matched with arbitrary multiplicity, as long as the capacity constraints are respected. Chen [1] presents a polynomial-time algorithm for the variation of many-to-many matching in which a pair of agents can only be matched with multiplicity one. Kamiyama [8] addresses the same problem using a different algorithmic approach. (The algorithms of Chen and Kamiyama are strongly polynomial, since we can assume without loss of generality that the capacity of any agent is at most the number of agents on the other side of the market.) Since this variation of the many-to-many setting also generalizes CAS, it does not admit a strategyproof mechanism, even for the agents on one side of the market.
Erdil and Ergin [4, 5] and Kesten [9] consider a second natural solution concept in addition to Pareto-stability. In the context of SMIW (or its special case SMCW), this second solution concept seeks a weakly stable matching M that is "man optimal" in the following sense: for all weakly stable matchings M ′ , either all of the men are indifferent between M and M ′ , or at least one man prefers M to M ′ . Erdil and Ergin [4] present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute such a man optimal weakly stable matching for SMIW; in fact, their algorithm is presented for the generalization of SMIW to CAW. Erdil and Ergin [5] and Kesten [9] prove that no strategyproof man optimal weakly stable mechanism exists for SMCW. Prior to our work, it was unclear whether such an impossibility result might hold for strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanisms for SMCW (or its generalizations to SMIW and CAW).
The assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [15] can be viewed as an auction with multiple distinct items where each bidder is seeking to acquire at most one item. This class of unit-demand auctions has been heavily studied in the literature (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor [14, Chapter 8] ). In Section 2, we define the notion of a "unit-demand auction with priorities" (UAP) and establish a number of useful properties of UAPs; these are straightforward generalizations of corresponding properties of unit-demand auctions. Section 3 builds on the UAP notion to define the notion of an "iterated UAP" (IUAP), and establishes a number of important properties of IUAPs; these results are nontrivial to prove and provide the technical foundation for our main results. Section 4 presents our first main result, a polynomial-time algorithm for SMIW that provides a strategyproof Paretostable mechanism. Section 5 presents our second main result, a polynomial-time algorithm for CAW that provides a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism assuming that the preferences of the colleges are minimally responsive.
Unit-Demand Auctions with Priorities
In this section, we formally define the notion of a unit-demand auction with priorities (UAP). In Section 2.1, we describe an associated matroid for a given UAP and we use this matroid to define the notion of a "greedy MWM". In Section 2.2, we establish a result related to extending a given UAP by introducing additional bidders. In Section 2.3, we discuss how to efficiently compute a greedy MWM in a UAP. In Section 2.4, we introduce a key definition that is helpful for establishing our strategyproofness results. We start with some useful definitions.
A (unit-demand) bid β for a set of items V is a subset of V × R such that no two pairs in β share the same first component. (So β may be viewed as a partial function from V to R.)
A bidder u for a set of items V is a triple (α, β, z) where α is an integer ID, β is a bid for V , and z is a real priority. For any bidder u = (α, β, z), we define id(u) as α, bid(u) as β, priority(u) as z, and items(u) as the union, over all (v, x) in β, of {v}.
A unit-demand auction with priorities (UAP) is a pair A = (U, V ) satisfying the following conditions: V is a set of items; U is a set of bidders for V ; each bidder in U has a distinct ID.
An Associated Matroid
A UAP A = (U, V ) may be viewed as an edge-weighted bipartite graph, where the set of edges incident on bidder u correspond to bid(u): for each pair (v, x) in bid(u), there is an edge (u, v) of weight x. We refer to a matching (resp., maximum-weight matching (MWM), maximumcardinality MWM (MCMWM)) in the associated edge-weighted bipartite graph as a matching (resp., MWM, MCMWM) of A. For any edge e = (u, v) in a given UAP, the associated weight is denoted w(e) or w (u, v) . For any set of edges E, we define w(E) as e∈E w(e). For any UAP A, we let w(A) denote the weight of an MWM of A. Lemma 1. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, and let I denote the set of all subsets U ′ of U such that there exists an MWM of A that matches every bidder in U ′ . Then (U, I) is a matroid.
Proof. The only nontrivial property to show is the exchange property. 
It follows that there is at least one path in this collection, call it P , such that one endpoint of P is a bidder u in U 1 \ U 2 and the other endpoint of P is a vertex y that does not belong to U 2 \ U 1 . Moreover, y does not belong to U 1 : if the length of P is odd, then y is an item and hence does not belong to U 1 ; if the length of P is even, then y is not matched in M 1 and hence does not belong to U 1 . Since y does not belong to U 2 \ U 1 and does not belong to U 1 , we conclude that y does not belong to U 2 . The edges of P alternate between M 1 and M 2 . Let X 1 denote the edges of P that belong to M 1 , and let X 2 denote the edges of P that belong to M 2 . Since M 1 is an MWM of A and M Proof. This is a standard matroid result that follows easily from the exchange property and the correctness of the matroid greedy algorithm.
For any UAP A and any real priority z, we define greedy(A, z) as the (uniquely defined, by Lemma 2) number of matched bidders with priority z in any greedy MWM of A.
Lemma 3. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP. Let u be a bidder in U such that (v, x) belongs to bid(u), priority(u) = z, and u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A. Let u ′ be a bidder in U such that
Extending a UAP
Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP and let u be a bidder such that id(u) is not equal to the ID of any bidder in U. Then we define A + u as the UAP (U + u, V ). For any UAPs A = (U, V ) and
Lemma 4. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, let u be a bidder in U that is not matched in any greedy MWM of A, and let A ′ = (U ′ , V ) be a UAP that extends A. Then u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A ′ .
Proof. In what follows, we derive a contradiction by proving that u is matched in a greedy MWM M 1 of A ′ . We need to prove that u is matched in some greedy MWM of A. Let M 0 denote a greedy MWM of A. If u is matched in M 0 , we are done, so assume that u is not matched in M 0 . Thus M 0 ⊕ M 1 contains a unique path P with u as an endpoint. The edges of P alternate between M 0 and M 1 . Let X 0 denote the edges of P that belong to M 0 , and let X 1 denote the edges of P that belong to M 1 .
Since u is matched in M 1 and not in M 0 , the other endpoint of P is either an item, or it is a bidder that is matched in M 0 and not in M 1 . Either way, we deduce that all of the vertices on P belong to A.
Since all of the vertices on P belong to A ′ , we conclude that M
Since u is matched in M 1 and not in M 0 , we deduce that 
Finding a Greedy MWM
In this section, we briefly discuss how to efficiently compute a greedy MWM of a UAP via a slight modification of the classic Hungarian method for the assignment problem [10] . In the (maximization version of the) assignment problem, we are given a set of n agents, a set of n tasks, and a weight for each agent-task pair, and our objective is to find a perfect matching (i.e., every agent and task is required to be matched) of maximum total weight. The Hungarian method for the assignment problem proceeds as follows: a set of dual variables, namely a "price" for each task, and a possibly incomplete matching are maintained; an arbitrary unmatched agent u is chosen and a shortest augmenting path from u to an unmatched task is computed using "residual costs" as the edge weights; an augmentation is performed along the path to update the matching, and the dual variables are adjusted in order to maintain complementary slackness; the process repeats until a perfect matching is found.
Within our UAP setting, the set of bidders can be larger than the set of items, and some bidderitem pairs may not be matchable, i.e., the associated bipartite graph is not necessarily complete. In this setting, we can use an "incremental" version of the Hungarian method to find an (not necessarily greedy) MWM of a given UAP A = (U, V ) as follows. For the purpose of simplifying the presentation of our method, we enlarge the set of items by adding a dummy item v 0 such that v 0 is connected to each bidder u with an edge of weight w(u, v 0 ) = 0 and we always maintain v 0 in the residual graph with a price of 0. We start with the empty matching M. Then, for each bidder u in U (in arbitrary order), we process u via an "incremental Hungarian step" as follows: let U ′ denote the set of bidders that are matched by M; let V ′ denote the set of items that are not matched by M; find the shortest paths from u to each item v in V ′ + v 0 in the residual graph; let W denote the minimum path weight among these shortest paths; choose a path P that is either (1) a shortest path of weight W from u to an item v in V ′ , or (2) a shortest path from u to a bidder u ′ in U ′ + u such that extending P with the edge (u ′ , v 0 ) yields a shortest path of weight W from u to v 0 ; augment M along P ; adjust the prices in order to maintain complementary slackness; update the residual graph. The algorithm terminates when every non-reserve bidder has been processed. The algorithm performs |U| incremental Hungarian steps and each incremental Hungarian step can be implemented in O(|V | log |V | + m) time by utilizing Fibonacci heaps [6] , where m denotes the number of edges in the residual graph, which is O(|V | 2 ). In order to find a greedy MWM, we slightly modify the implementation described in the previous paragraph. Lemmas 7 and 8 established below imply that choosing the path P in the following way results in a greedy MWM: if a path of type (1) exists, we arbitrarily choose such a path; if no path of type (1) exists, then we identify the nonempty set U ′′ of all bidders u ′ such that a path of type (2) exists, and we choose a shortest path P that terminates at a minimum priority bidder in U ′′ . It is easy to see that the described modification does not increase the asymptotic time complexity of the algorithm. In the remainder of this section, we establish Lemmas 7, 8, and 9; Lemma 9 is used in Section 3.2.1 to prove Lemma 19. We start with some useful definitions.
Let A = (U, V ) and A ′ = A + u be UAPs, and let M be an MWM of A. We define digraph(A, u, M) as the edge-weighted digraph that may be obtained by modifying the subgraph of A induced by the set of vertices (matched(M) + u) ∪ V as follows: for each edge that belongs to M, we direct the edge from item to bidder and leave the weight unchanged; for each edge that does not belong to M, we direct the edge from bidder to item and negate the weight. Proof. Such a cycle could not involve u (since u only has outgoing edges) so it has to be a negativeweight cycle that already existed before u was added, a contradiction since M is an MWM of A.
Let A = (U, V ) and A ′ = A + u be UAPs, let M be an MWM of A, and let G denote digraph(A, u, M). We define a set of items holes(A, u, M), and a set of bidders candidates(A, u, M), as follows. By Lemma 5, the shortest path distance in G from bidder u to any vertex reachable from u is well-defined. We define holes(A, u, M) as the set of all items v in V such that v is unmatched in M and the weight of a shortest path in G from u to v is w(A) − w(A ′ ). We define candidates(A, u, M) as the set of all bidders u ′ such that the weight of a shortest path in G from u to u ′ is equal to w(A) − w(A ′ ). Let A = (U, V ) and A ′ = A + u be UAPs, let M be an MWM of A, and let P be a directed path in digraph(A, u, M) that starts at u, has weight w(A) − w(A ′ ), and terminates at either an item in holes(A, u, M) or a bidder in candidates(A, u, M). (Note that P could be a path of length zero from u to u.) Let X denote the edges in M that correspond to item-to-bidder edges in P , and let Y denote the edges in A ′ that correspond to bidder-to-item edges in P . It is easy to see that the set of edges
contains a directed path P satisfying the following conditions: P has weight w(A) − w(A ′ ); P starts at u; the bidder-to-item edges in P correspond to the edges in M ′ \ M; the item-to-bidder edges in P correspond to the edges in M \ M ′ ; if holes(A, u, M) is nonempty, then P terminates at an item in holes(A, u, M); if holes(A, u, M) is empty, then P terminates at a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u, M).
Proof. The edges of M ⊕ M
′ form a collection S of disjoint cycles and paths of positive length. We begin by arguing that S does not contain any cycles. Suppose there is a cycle C in S. Let X denote the edges of C that belong to M \ M ′ , and let Y denote the edges of C that belong to
Next we argue that if Q is a path in S, then u is an endpoint of Q. Suppose there is a path Q in S such that u is not an endpoint of Q. Thus u does not appear on Q since u is unmatched in M. Let X denote the edges of Q that belong to M \ M ′ , and let Y denote the edges of Q that
Since M is a greedy MWM and hence an MCMWM of A, the set of bidders matched by M is not properly contained in the set of bidders matched by M ′′ ; we conclude that |X| ≥ |Y |. Since M ′ is a greedy MWM and hence an MCMWM of A ′ , the set of bidders matched by M ′ is not properly contained in the set of bidders matched by M ′′′ ; we conclude that |X| ≤ |Y |. Thus |X| = |Y |, so the length of path Q is even. We consider two cases. 
The endpoints of Q are bidders. Since Q has positive length, one endpoint, call it u 0 , is matched in M but not in M ′ , and the other endpoint, call it u 1 , is matched in
From the preceding arguments, we deduce that either M = M ′ or M ⊕ M ′ corresponds to a positive-length path with u as an endpoint. Equivalently, M ⊕ M ′ is the edge set of a path that has u as an endpoint and may have length zero (i.e., the path may begin and end at u). We claim if the edges of this path are directed away from endpoint u, we obtain a directed path P satisfying the six conditions stated in the lemma. It is easy to see that P satisfies the first four of these conditions. It remains to establish that P satisfies the fifth and sixth conditions.
For the fifth condition, assume that holes(A, u, M) is nonempty. We need to prove that P terminates at an item in holes(A, u, M). Since holes(A, u, M) is nonempty, we deduce that |M ′ | = |M|+1, and hence that P terminates at some item v. Since P has weight w(A)−w(A ′ ), we deduce that v belongs to holes(A, u, M), as required.
For the sixth condition, assume that holes(A, u, M) is empty. We need to prove that P terminates at a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u, M). Suppose P terminates at some item v. Since P has weight w(A) − w(A ′ ), we deduce that v belongs to holes(A, u, M), a contradiction. Thus P terminates at some bidder u
, it is easy to argue that M ′ is not a greedy MWM of A ′ , a contradiction. Thus P terminates at a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u, M).
the set of bidders in A matched by M. Since holes(A, u, M) is nonempty, Lemma 6 implies that the set of bidders in
Lemma 8. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, let M be a greedy MWM of A, let u be a bidder that does not belong to U, and let A ′ denote the UAP (U + u, V ). Assume that holes(A, u, M) is empty. Let u ′ denote a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u, M) (which is nonempty by Lemma 6), 
Threshold of an Item
In this section, we define the notion of a "threshold" of an item in a UAP. This lays the groundwork for a corresponding IUAP definition in Section 3.2. Item thresholds play an important role in our strategyproofness results.
Lemma 10. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP and let v be an item in V . Let U ′ be the set of bidders u such that A + u is a UAP and bid(u) is of the form {(v, x)}. Then there is a unique pair of reals (x * , z * ) such that for any bidder u in U ′ , the following conditions hold, where 
For any UAP A = (U, V ) and any item v in V , we define the unique pair (x * , z * ) of Lemma 10 as threshold(A, v).
Iterated Unit-Demand Auctions with Priorities
In this section, we formally define the notion of an iterated unit-demand auction with priorities (IUAP). An IUAP allows the bidders, called "multibidders" in this context, to have a sequence of unit-demand bids instead of a single unit-demand bid. In Section 3.1, we define a mapping from an IUAP to a UAP by describing an algorithm that generalizes the DA algorithm, and we establish Lemma 15 that is useful for analyzing the matching produced by Algorithm 2 of Section 4. Lemma 15 is used to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27, 28, and 29) and Pareto-optimality (Lemma 30). In Section 3.2, we define the threshold of an item in an IUAP and we establish Lemma 18, which plays a key role in establishing our strategyproofness results. We start with some useful definitions.
A multibidder t for a set of items V is a pair (σ, z) where z is a real priority and σ is a sequence of bidders for V such that all the bidders in σ have distinct IDs and a common priority z. We define priority(t) as z. For any integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |σ|, we define bidder(t, i) as the bidder σ(i). For any integer i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ |σ|, we define bidders(t, i) as {bidder(t, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ i}. We define bidders(t) as bidders(t, |σ|).
An iterated UAP (IUAP) is a pair B = (T, V ) where V is a set of items and T is a set of multibidders for V . In addition, for any distinct multibidders t and t ′ in T , the following conditions hold: priority(t) = priority(t ′ ); if u belongs to bidders(t) and u ′ belongs to bidders(t ′ ), then id(u) = id(u ′ ). For any IUAP B = (T, V ), we define bidders(B) as the union, over all t in T , of bidders(t).
Mapping an IUAP to a UAP
Having defined the notion of an IUAP, we now describe an algorithm TOUAP that maps a given IUAP to a UAP. Algorithm TOUAP generalizes the DA algorithm. In each iteration of the DA algorithm, a single man is nondeterministically chosen, and this man reveals his next choice. In each iteration of TOUAP, a single multibidder is nondeterministically chosen, and this multibidder reveals its next bid. We prove in Lemma 14 that, like the DA algorithm, algorithm TOUAP is confluent: the output does not depend on the nondeterministic choices made during an execution. We conclude this section by establishing Lemma 15, which is useful for analyzing the matching produced by Algorithm 2 in Section 4. Lemma 15 is used to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27, 28, and 29) and Pareto-optimality (Lemma 30). We start with some useful definitions.
Let A be a UAP (U, V ) and let B be an IUAP (T, V ). The predicate prefix(A, B) is said to hold if U ⊆ bidders(B) and for any multibidder t in T , U ∩ bidders(t) = bidders(t, i) for some i.
A configuration C is a pair (A, B) where A is a UAP, B is an IUAP, and prefix (A, B) holds. Let C = (A, B) be a configuration, where A = (U, V ) and B = (T, V ), and let u be a bidder in U. Then we define multibidder(C, u) as the unique multibidder t in T such that u belongs to bidders(t).
Let C = (A, B) be a configuration where A = (U, V ) and B = (T, V ). For any t in T , we define bidders(C, t) as {u ∈ U | multibidder(C, u) = t}.
Let C = (A, B) be a configuration where B = (T, V ). We define ready(C) as the set of all bidders u in bidders(B) such that greedy(A, priority(u)) = 0 and u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)| + 1) where t = multibidder(C, u).
Algorithm 1 TOUAP(B)
Input:
while ready(C) is nonempty do
4:
A ← A+ an arbitrary bidder in ready(C)
5:
C ← (A, B) 6: end while 7: return A Our algorithm for mapping an IUAP to a UAP is Algorithm 1. The input is an IUAP B and the output is a UAP A such that prefix (A, B) holds. The algorithm starts with the UAP consisting of all the items in V but no bidders. At this point, no bidder of any multibidder is "revealed". Then, the algorithm iteratively and nondeterministically chooses a "ready" bidder and "reveals" it by adding it to the UAP that is maintained in the program variable A. A bidder u associated with some multibidder t = (σ, z) is ready if u is not revealed and for each bidder u ′ that precedes u in σ, u ′ is revealed and is not matched in any greedy MWM of A. It is easy to verify that the predicate prefix (A, B) is an invariant of the algorithm loop: if a bidder u belonging to a multibidder t is to be revealed at an iteration, and U ∩ bidders(t) = bidders(t, i) for some integer i at the beginning of this iteration, then U ∩ bidders(t) = bidders(t, i + 1) after revealing u, where (U, V ) is the UAP that is maintained by the program variable A at the beginning of the iteration. No bidder can be revealed more than once since a bidder cannot be ready after it has been revealed; it follows that the algorithm terminates. We now argue that the output of the algorithm is uniquely determined (Lemma 14), even though the bidder that is revealed in each iteration is chosen nondeterministically.
For any configuration C = (A, B) , we define the predicate tail(C) to hold if for any bidder u that is matched in some greedy MWM of A, we have u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|) where t denotes multibidder(C, u). Proof. It is easy to see that tail(C) holds when the loop is first encountered. Now consider an iteration of the loop that takes us from configuration C = (A, B) where
. We need to show that tail(C ′ ) holds. Let u be a bidder that is matched in some greedy MWM M ′ of A ′ . Let u * denote the bidder that is added to A in line 4, and consider the following three cases.
Case
, as required. Case 2: u = u * and priority(u) = priority(u * ). Since U ′ contains U, Lemma 4 implies that u is matched in some greedy MWM of A. Since C is a configuration and tail(C) holds, we deduce that u = bidder ( 
t, |bidders(C, t)|) where t denotes multibidder(C, u). Since multibidder(C ′ , u) = multibidder(C, u) and bidders(C ′ , t) = bidders(C, t), we conclude that u is equal to bidder(t, |bidders(C ′ , t)|) where t denotes multibidder(C
′ , u), as required. Case 3: u = u * and priority(u) = priority(u * ). Since u * belongs to ready(C), we know that greedy(A, priority(u)) = 0. Also, since u is not u * , u belongs to U and we conclude that u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A. Since U ′ contains U, Lemma 4 implies that u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A ′ , a contradiction.
Lemma 13. Let C = (A, B) be a configuration such that tail(C) holds. Then unique(A) holds.

Proof. Let M and M ′ be greedy MWMs of A, and let u be a bidder in matched(M). To establish the lemma, it is sufficient to prove that u belongs to matched(M ′ ). Let t denote multibidder(C, u) and let z denote priority(t). Since tail(C) holds, we know that u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|).
Since u is matched by M and since tail(C) holds, Lemma 11 implies that greedy(A, z) = 1. Thus Lemma 2 implies that M ′ matches one priority-z bidder. Since tail(C) holds, this bidder is u.
Lemma 14. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP. Then all executions of Algorithm 1 on input B produce the same output.
Proof. Suppose not, and let X 1 and X 2 denote two executions of Algorithm 1 on input B that produce distinct output UAPs We can use the modified incremental Hungarian step of Section 2.3 in each iteration of the loop of Algorithm 1 to maintain UAP A, and a greedy MWM of A, as follows: we maintain dual variables (a price for each item) and a residual graph; the initial greedy MWM is the empty matching; when a bidder u is added to A at line 4, we perform an incremental Hungarian step to process u to update the greedy MWM, the prices, and the residual graph. Since we maintain a greedy MWM of A at each iteration of the loop, it is easy to see that identifying a bidder in ready(C) (or determining that this set is empty) takes O(|V |) time. Thus the whole algorithm can be implemented in O(|bidders(B)| · |V | 2 ) time. We now present a lemma that is used in Section 4 to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27, 28, and 29) and Pareto-optimality (Lemma 30).
Lemma 15. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let (σ, z) be a multibidder that belongs to T , let uap(B) be (U, V ), and let M be a greedy MWM of the UAP (U, V ). Then the following claims hold:
Proof. Since prefix(A, B)
and tail(C) hold at the end of Algorithm 1 by Lemma 12, the first claim follows. Since ready(C) is empty at the end of Algorithm 1, the second claim follows.
Threshold of an Item
In this section, we define the threshold of an item in an IUAP and we establish Lemma 18, which plays a key role in establishing our strategyproofness results. We start with some useful definitions.
For any IUAP B, Lemmas 12 and 13 imply that unique(uap(B)) holds, and thus that every greedy MWM of uap(B) matches the same set of bidders. We define this set of matched bidders as winners(B). For any IUAP B, we define losers(B) as U \ winners(B) where (U, V ) is uap(B).
Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP and let u = (α, β, z) be a bidder for V . Then we define the IUAP B + u as follows: if T contains a multibidder t of the form (σ, z) for some sequence of bidders σ, then we define B + u as (T − t + t ′ , V ) where t ′ = (σ ′ , z) and σ ′ is the sequence of bidders obtained by appending u to σ; otherwise, we define B + u as (T + t, V ) where t = ( u , z). ′ ) , and hence that u ′ belongs to losers(B ′ ).
Lemma 16. Let B = (T, V ) and B ′ = B + u be IUAPs. Then losers(B) ⊆ losers(B ′ ).
Proof. Let u ′ be a bidder in losers(B). Thus u ′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B). Using Lemma 14, it is easy to see that uap(B ′ ) extends uap(B). Thus Lemma 4 implies that u ′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B
Lemma 17. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP and let v be an item in V . For i ∈ {1, 2}, let B i = B + u i be an IUAP where We are now ready to define the threshold of an item in an IUAP, and to state Lemma 18. In Section 4, Lemma 18 plays an important role in establishing that our SMIW mechanism is strategyproof (Lemma 32). The proof of Lemma 18 is provided in Section 3.2. 
V ). We define uap(B, v) as the UAP (U, V ), and we define threshold(B, v) as threshold(uap(B, v), v).
Lemma 18. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let t = (σ, z) be a multibidder that belongs to T , and let
Furthermore, for each k
Proof of Lemma 18
The purpose of this section is to prove Lemma 18. We do so by establishing a stronger result, namely Lemma 26 below. We start with a useful definition. For any IUAP B, we define priorities(B) as {z | u ∈ winners(B) and priority(u) = z}.
Lemma 19. Let B = (T, V ) and B
Proof. Consider running Algorithm 1 on input B ′ , where we avoid selecting bidder u from ready(C) unless it is the only bidder in ready(C). (By Lemma 14, the final output is the same regardless of which bidder is selected from ready(C) at each iteration.) If u never enters ready(C), then uap(B ′ ) = uap(B), and so Z ′ = Z, and the claim of the lemma holds. Now suppose that u enters ready(C) at some point. Let A = (U, V ) denote the UAP at the start of the iteration in which u is selected from ready(C). Then A is equal to uap(B), and we deduce that uap(B ′ ) extends uap(B). Lemma 11 implies that every greedy MWM of A = uap(B) (resp., uap(B ′ )) matches exactly one bidder of each priority in Z (resp., Z ′ ). 
Now assume that u belongs to losers(B ′ ). Thus u is not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B ′ ). Define U so that uap(B ′ ) = (U + u, V ), and let A denote the UAP (U, V ). Lemma 10 implies that (x, z) < threshold(A, v). Lemma 17 implies that uap(B, v) + u extends uap(B ′ ), and hence that uap(B, v) extends A. Lemma 20 therefore implies that threshold(A, v) ≤ threshold(uap(B, v), v) = threshold(B, v).
Thus (x, z) < threshold(B, v), as required. v) , and assume for the sake of contradiction that 
Proof. Suppose not. Let
Since z does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that u belongs to U ′ . Thus u belongs to U ′ \ winners(B ′ ) = losers(B ′ ), and so ) , and hence that u is unmatched in M. By Lemma 3, we find that (x, z) < (x, z ′ ) and hence z < z ′ , a contradiction.
Lemma 25. Let B = (T, V ) and B 0 = B + u be IUAPs where u = (α, β, z), z does not belong to priorities(B), and
Proof. Suppose not. Since z does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that u belongs to winners(B 0 ), and hence that z belongs to priorities(B 0 ). We claim that u belongs to winners(B k ). To prove this claim, let t denote the unique multibidder in B k for which priority(t) = priority(u). Let ℓ denote |bidders(t)|, and observe that u = bidder(t, ℓ). Furthermore, since z does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that bidder(t, i) belongs to losers(B) for 1 ≤ i < ℓ. By repeated application of Lemma 16, we deduce that bidder(t, i) belongs to losers(B k ) for 1 ≤ i < ℓ. Since z belongs to priorities(B k ), the claim follows.
Let M denote a greedy MWM of uap(B k ). Since u belongs to winners(B k ), there is a unique integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that M contains edge (u, v i ). Let i denote this integer. Since z i does not belong to priorities(B k ), we know that u i belongs to losers(B k ) and hence that u i is not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B k ). By Lemma 3, we deduce that (x i , z i ) < (x i , z) . Hence z i < z, contradicting the definition of z i .
Lemma 26. Let B 0 = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let z be a real that is not equal to the priority of any multibidder in T , let k be a nonnegative integer, and for i ranging from 1 to k, let B i denote the IUAP B i−1 + u i , where priority(u i ) = z. Let I denote the set of all integers i in {1, . . . , k} such that there exists an item v in V for which (w(u i , v), z) > threshold(B 0 , v) . If I is empty, then z does not belong to priorities(B k ). Otherwise, u j belongs to winners(B k ), where j denotes the minimum integer in I.
Proof. If I is empty, then by repeated application of Lemmas 23 and 25, we find that u i belongs to losers(B i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By repeated application of Lemma 16, we deduce that u i belongs to losers(B k ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows that z does not belong to priorities(B k ), as required. Now assume that I is nonempty, and let j denote the minimum integer in I. Arguing as in the preceding paragraph, we find that z does not belong to priorities(B j−1 ). By repeated application of Lemma 23, we deduce that threshold(B j−1 , v) = threshold(B 0 , v) for all items v in V . Thus Lemma 24 implies that u j belongs to winners(B j ). Then, since u j+1 , . . . , u k all have the same priority as u j , it is easy to argue by Lemma 14 that uap(B k ) = uap(B j ), and hence u j belongs to winners(B k ), as required.
Proof of Lemma 18.
It is easy to see that the claims of the lemma follow from Lemma 26.
Stable Marriage with Indifferences
The stable marriage model with incomplete and weak preferences (SMIW) involves a set P of men and a set Q of women. The preference relation of each man p in P is specified as a binary relation p over Q ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. Similarly, the preference relation of each woman q in Q is specified as a binary relation q over P ∪{∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. To allow indifferences, the preference relations are not required to satisfy antisymmetry. We will use ≻ p and ≻ q to denote the asymmetric part of p and q respectively.
A matching is a function µ from P to Q ∪ {∅} such that for any woman q in Q, there exists at most one man p in P for which µ(p) = q. Given a matching µ and a woman q in Q, we denote
A matching µ is individually rational if for any man p in P and woman q in Q such that µ(p) = q, we have q p ∅ and p q ∅. A pair (p, q ′ ) in P × Q is said to form a strongly blocking
A matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and does not admit a strongly blocking pair.
For any matching µ and µ ′ , we say that the binary relation µ µ ′ holds if for every man p in P and woman q in Q, we have µ(p) p µ ′ (p) and µ(q) q µ ′ (q). We let ≻ denote the asymmetric part of . We say that a matching µ Pareto-dominates another matching µ ′ if µ ≻ µ ′ . We say that a matching is Pareto-optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other matching. A matching is Pareto-stable if it is Pareto-optimal and weakly stable.
A mechanism is an algorithm that, given (P, Q, ( p ) p∈P , ( q ) q∈Q ), produces a matching µ. A mechanism is said to be strategyproof (for the men) if for any man p in P expressing preference ′ p instead of his true preference p , we have µ(p) p µ ′ (p), where µ and µ ′ are the matchings produced by the mechanism given p and ′ p , respectively, when all other inputs are fixed. By introducing extra men or women who prefer being unmatched to being matched with any potential partner, we may assume without loss of generality that the number of men is equal to the number of women. So, P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } and Q = {q 1 , . . . , q n }.
Algorithm
The computation of a matching for SMIW is shown in Algorithm 2. We construct an item for each woman in line 4, and a multibidder for each man in line 13 by examining the tiers of preferences of the men and the utilities of the women. Together with dummy items constructed in line 8, this forms an IUAP, from which we obtain a UAP and a greedy MWM M 0 . Using Lemma 15, we argue that for any man p i , exactly one of the bidders associated with p i is matched in M 0 ; see the proof of Lemma 27. Finally, in line 18, we use M 0 to determine the match of a man p i as follows, where u denotes the unique bidder associated with p i that is matched in M 0 : if u is matched in M 0 to the item corresponding to a woman q j , then we match p i to q j ; otherwise, u is matched to a dummy item in M 0 , and we leave p i unmatched.
In Lemma 28, we prove individually rationality by arguing that the dummy items ensure that no man or woman is matched to an unacceptable partner. In Lemma 29, we prove weak stability using the properties of a greedy MWM. In Lemmas 30 and 31, we prove Pareto-optimality by showing that any matching that Pareto-dominates the output matching induces another MWM that contradicts the greediness of the MWM produced by the algorithm. In Lemma 32, we establish two properties of IUAP thresholds that are used to show strategyproofness in Theorem 1.
Lemma 27. Algorithm 2 produces a valid matching.
Proof. First, we show that for any man p i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists at most one j in {1, . . . , 2n} such that bidder σ i (k) is matched to item v j in M 0 for some k. For the sake of contradiction, suppose bidder σ i (k) is matched to item v j and bidder
is matched in M 0 to both v j and v j ′ , which is a contradiction. Next, we show that for any man p i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists at least one j in {1, . . . , 2n} such that bidder σ i (k) is matched to item v j in M 0 for some k. For the sake of contradiction, suppose bidder σ i (k) is unmatched in M 0 for all k. Let j denote n + i and let k denote κ i (q j ). By Lemma 15, the set U contains bidder σ i (k). Since both bidder σ i (k) and item v j are unmatched by M 0 , adding the pair (σ i (k), v j ) to M 0 gives a matching of (U, V ) with the same weight and larger cardinality. This contradicts the fact that M 0 is a greedy MWM of (U, V ).
Convert the preference relation q j of woman q j into utility function ψ q j : P ∪ {∅} → R that satisfies the followings: ψ q j (∅) = 0; for any i and i ′ in {0, 1, . . . , n}, we have p i q j p i ′ if and only if ψ q j (p i ) ≥ ψ q j (p i ′ ). This utility assignment should not depend on the preferences of the men. 4: Construct an item v j corresponding to woman q j . 5: end for 6: for all n < j ≤ 2n do 7: Let q j denote ∅.
8:
Construct a dummy item v j corresponding to q j . 9: end for 10: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n do 11: Partition the set {1, . . . , n}∪{n+i} of woman indices into tiers τ i (1), . . . , τ i (K i ) according to the preference relation of man p i , such that for any j in τ i (k) and j
12:
For j in {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i}, denote tier number κ i (q j ) as the unique k such that j in τ i (k). This shows that µ(p i ) is well-defined for all men p i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, since each item v j where 1 ≤ j ≤ n is matched to at most one bidder in M 0 , each woman q j is matched to at most one man p i in µ where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, µ is a valid matching.
Lemma 28. Algorithm 2 produces an individually rational matching.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 27 that µ is a valid matching. Consider man p i and woman q j such that µ(p i ) = q j , where i and j belong to {1, . . . , n}. Let k denote κ i (q j ) and let
It remains to show that k ≤ k ′ . For the sake of contradiction, suppose k > k ′ . Since bidder
is not matched in M 0 , the dummy item v n+i is also not matched in M 0 . Hence, adding the pair (σ i (k ′ ), v n+i ) to M 0 gives a matching in (U, V ) with the same weight and larger cardinality. This contradicts the fact that M 0 is a greedy MWM of (U, V ). Lemma 15 implies that the set U contains bidder σ i (k ′ ) and that σ i (k ′ ) is unmatched in M 0 . We consider two cases.
Case 1:
gives a matching of (U, V ) with a larger weight. This contradicts the fact that M 0 is an MWM of (U, V ).
Case 2:
, which is greater than w(M 0 ). This contradicts the fact that M 0 is an MWM of (U, V ).
Lemma 30. Let µ be the matching produced by Algorithm 2 and let µ ′ be a matching such that 
Proof. For any
0 is a matching of (U, V ). Furthermore, it is easy to see that
is an MWM of (U, V ), and we have 
Lemma 31. Let µ be the matching produced by Algorithm 2 and µ ′ be a matching such that µ
Notice that in Algorithm 2, the only part of the IUAP instance that depends on the preferences of man p i is the multibidder corresponding to man p i . In particular, we have
which is a contradiction.
College Admissions with Indifferences
The college admissions model with weak preferences (CAW) involves a set P of students and a set Q of colleges. The preference relation of each student p in P is specified as a binary relation p over Q ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. The preference relation of each college q in Q over individual students is specified as a binary relation q over P ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. Each college q in Q has an associated integer capacity c q > 0. We will use ≻ p and ≻ q to denote the asymmetric parts of p and q , respectively.
The colleges' preference relation over individual students can be extended to group preference using responsiveness. We say that a transitive and reflexive relation ′ q over the power set 2 P is responsive to the preference relation q if the following conditions hold: for any S ⊆ P and p in P \ S, we have p q ∅ if and only if S ∪ {p} ′ q S; for any S ⊆ P and any p and p ′ in P \ S, we have p q p ′ if and only if S ∪ {p} ′ q S ∪ {p ′ }. Furthermore, we say that a relation ′ q is minimally responsive to the preference relation q if it is responsive to the preference relation q and does not strictly contain another relation that is responsive to the preference relation q .
A (capacitated) matching is a function µ from P to Q ∪ {∅} such that for any college q in Q, there exists at most c q students p in P for which µ(p) = q. Given a matching µ and a college q in Q, we let µ(q) denote {p ∈ P | µ(p) = q}.
A matching µ is individually rational if for any student p in P and college q in Q such that µ(p) = q, we have q p ∅ and p q ∅. A pair (p ′ , q) in P × Q is said to form a strongly blocking pair for a matching µ if q ≻ p ′ µ(p ′ ) and at least one of the following two conditions holds: (1) there exists a student p in P such that µ(p) = q and p ′ ≻ q p; (2) |µ(q)| < c q and p ′ ≻ q ∅. A matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and does not admit a strongly blocking pair. Let ′ q be the group preference associated with college q in Q. For any matching µ and µ ′ , we say that the binary relation µ µ ′ holds if for every student p in P and college q in Q, we have µ(p) p µ ′ (p) and µ(q) ′ q µ ′ (q). We let ≻ denote the asymmetric part of . We say that a matching µ Pareto-dominates another matching µ ′ if µ ≻ µ ′ . We say that a matching is Paretooptimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other matching. A matching is Pareto-stable if it is Pareto-optimal and weakly stable.
A mechanism is an algorithm that, given (P, Q,
, produces a matching µ. A mechanism is said to be strategyproof (for the students) if for any student p in P expressing preference Without loss of generality, we may assume that the number of students equals the total capacity of the colleges. So, P = {p i } 1≤i≤|P | and Q = {q j } 1≤j≤|Q| such that |P | = 1≤j≤|Q| c q j .
Algorithm
The computation of a matching for CAW is shown in Algorithm 3. We transform each student to a man in line 1, and each slot of a college to a woman in line 2. This forms an SMIW. Using this SMIW, we produce a matching by invoking Algorithm 2 in lines 8 and 9. Proof. Since µ ′ is a matching that satisfies the capacity constraints, we can construct an SMIW matching µ Theorem 2. Suppose that for every college q in Q, the group preference relation ′ q is minimally responsive to q . Algorithm 3 is a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism for the college admissions problem with weak preferences (for any fixed choice of utility assignment).
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 34 that Algorithm 3 produces a weakly stable matching. Moreover, Lemma 35 shows that the weakly stable matching produced is not Pareto-dominated by any other matching. Hence, Algorithm 3 produces a Pareto-stable matching.
To show that Algorithm 3 provides a strategyproof mechanism, suppose student p i expresses We remark that our algorithm admits an O(n 4 )-time implementation, where n is the sum of the number of students and the total capacities of all the colleges, because the reduction from CAW to IUAP takes O(n 2 ) time, and lines 16 and 17 of Algorithm 2 can be implemented in O(n 4 ) time using the version of the incremental Hungarian method discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.1.
Further Discussion
In our SMIW and CAW algorithms, we transform the preference relations of the women and colleges into real-valued utility functions. One way to do this is to take
This is by no means the only way. In fact, different ways of assigning the utilities can affect the outcome. Nonetheless, our mechanisms remain strategyproof for the men as long as the utility assignment is fixed and independent of the preferences of the men, as shown in Theorems 1 and 2. We can also consider the scenario where each college expresses their preferences directly in terms of a utility function instead of a preference relation. Such utility functions provide another way to extend preferences over individuals to group preferences. If a college q expresses the utility function ψ q over individual students in P ∪ {∅}, we can define the group preference induced by additive utility ψ q as a binary relation Our algorithm can accept such utility functions as input in lieu of constructing them by some utility assignment method. It is not hard to see that the mechanism remains Pareto-stable and strategyproof when the group preferences of the colleges are induced by additive utilities.
